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CASE COMMENTS

untenantable are in effect synonymous, thereby actually only
reiterating the already ovenvhelming view in this country that
taking of the whole of leased property terminates the lease and
absolves the tenant from futher payment of rent.
It is further submitted that the West Virginia court may
reach the same result in a similar situation by our statute, W. VA.
CODE C. 37, art. 6, § 29 (Michie 1955), if the words "whole of any
tract of land" are construed to encompass untenantable property,
as was evidently done in the principal case. Once property is
determined to be untenantable it is for all practical purposes
completely useless to the lessee and should be considered destroyed
whether the act which renders it untenantable is from natural or
unforeseen causes or by eminent domain.
It should be noted however, that a taking under eminent
domain proceedings which absolves the tenant from his liability of
paying rent is not effected by the mere vesting of title in the
condemnor, but requires surrender of possession by the tenant.
Annot., 163 A.L.R. 679 (1946).
J.E. J.
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the engine off and leaving the key in the ignition. A thief stole D's
car and negligently collided with P's car. P brings action against
D for damages. Nonsuit; P appeals. Held, that failure to remove
switch key does not render owner of automobile liable for negligent
operation thereof by thief who steals it, especially where there is
no ordinance or state law against leaving key in ignition switch.
Affirmed. Williams v. Mickens, 100 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1957).
The instant case is only another of a rash of similar cases which
have appeared in the past two decades throughout the United
States. More than two dozen law review articles have been written
on the subject. See, e.g., Comments, 12 U. MiAmi L. REv. 120

(1957), 9 ALA. L. REv. 880 (1957). Therefore, this comment will
be confined to a brief review of the cases and the possible outcome
of a similar case in West Virginia.
In cases determining liability of an automobile owner to a third
party when an unauthorized driver is at fault, there is a dichotomy
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between (1) jurisdictions having statutes prohibiting a driver from
leaving the key in the ignition of an unattended vehicle, and (2)
jurisdictions having no such statute.
Among the states having no "car key" statute, the majority
view is that the owner is not liable for the thief's negligence. Among
the reasons advanced for this view are: (1) the negligence of the
thief is not foreseeable. Wagner v. Arthur, 134 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio
C.P. 1956); Holder v. Poperdan, 146 Cal. App. 2d 557, 804 P.2d
204 (1956). (2) The owner has no duty to anticipate such an act.
Curtisv. Jacobson,142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947). (3) There is
no proximate cause connection between acts of the owner and the
thief. Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (1951). (4)
The thief's act is the intervening proximate cause. Holder v. Poperdan, supra; Curtis v. Jacobson, supra. The owner has been held
liable under slightly different circumstances where small boys
wrecked his vehicle after having tampered with the vehicle on
previous occasions. See Lomano v. Ideal Towel Supply Co., 25
N.J. Misc. 162, 51 A.2d 888 (1947).
Among the states having "car key" statutes, the majority still
deny recovery against the owner. Reasons given in various jurisdictions are: (1) Violation of a penal statute is not intended to result
in civil liability. Cf. Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. App. 2d 58, 271
P.2d 25 (1954). (2) Although violation of a statute is negligence
per se, such negligence of the owner is not the proximate cause
of the injury. Anderson v. Theisin, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272
(1950); Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948).
(3) Negligence of the thief is not reasonably foreseeable. Kiste v.
Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952). (4) The
owner could not anticipate the theft and the injury. Frank v. Ralston, 145 F.Supp. 295 (W.D. Ky. 1956). But the minority view in
states having a statute holds that the owner's violation of the
statute is negligence and constitutes the proximate cause of the
injury. Ostergardv. Frisch,333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948);
Bullock v. Dahlstrom,46 A.2d 370 (D.C. Mun. App. 1946).
West Virginia has had a typical "car key" statute since 1951:
"No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit
it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing the key, and effectively setting the
brake thereon and, when standing upon any grade, turning the

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol60/iss4/16

2

T.: Negligence--Car Owner's Liability for Negligence of Thief After L
CASE COMMENTS
front wheels to curb or side of the highway." W. VA. CODE c.

17C, art. 14, § 1 (Michie 1955).
Thus far this statute has provoked no litigation reaching the supreme court.
It is settled law in this state that the violation of a statute is
prima facie negligence, but only if the violation is the proximate
cause of the injury. See e.g., State Road Comm'n v. Ball, 188 W.
Va. 849, 76 S.E.2d 55 (1958); Somerville v. Dellosa, 183 W. Va.
485, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949); Oldfield v. Woodall, 118 W. Va. 85,
166 S.E. 691 (1932); Tarr v. Lumber Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 144 S.E.
881 (1928). The proximate cause of an injury is the last negligent
act contributing thereto and without which the injury would not
have resulted. Webb v. Sessler, 185 W. Va. 841, 68 S.E.2d 65
(1950); Anderson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 74 W. Va. 17, 81 S.E.
579 (1914). Where there is a sole, effective intervening cause,
there can be no other proximate cause of the injury. Webb v. Sessler,
supra.
The most pertinent of all West Virginia cases holds that while
the negligent act of one person may naturally cause injury to
another, yet if before the injury results, the negligent act of a third
party intervenes and produces the injury, the latter alone is responsible, although but for the first negligent act the injury could not
have occurred. Anderson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra. Following
such a holding, the court could not hold the car owner liable in a
case such as the principal case even though he violated a statute.
In view of the foregoing, there seems to be no reason to believe
that the West Virginia court would not follow the majority rule,
absolving the owner of liability when a thief negligently injures a
third person; the act of the thief constituting the intervening and
proximate cause of the injury.
J. S. T.
RES JuDICATA-CoLLATERAL ATTAcK ON DECREE FOR SALE OF
LAmN

FOR

SCHOOL FuND.-Plaintiff brought suit to cancel two deeds

made by the deputy commissioner of forfeited and delinquent
lands conveying certain lands to the defendant. The deeds were
made pursuant to orders of the circuit court in a chancery suit
brought by the deputy commissioner directing and confirming the
sale of the land for the benefit of the school fund. Plaintiff alleged
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